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For A Time 
Kas Saghafi 
The University of Memphis 
What is the time of “for a time?” How long is “for a time?” How long 
does survival last?  
Less than an eternity, but not forever--for a time.1 
In his brilliant book Miracle and Machine: Jacques Derrida and the Two 
Sources of Religion, Science, and the Media, Michael Naas patiently and 
thoughtfully analyzes what he dubs a great philosophical text on religion, 
namely, Derrida’s essay “Faith and Knowledge” published in 1996.2 Naas’s 
book, itself a major work on Derrida’s thought, scrupulously guides and 
informs the reader about the structure and details of the “Faith and 
Knowledge” essay, which Naas calls “Derrida’s most direct and ambitious 
attempt to answer the question of the nature of religion in general and its 
relationship with science and the media” (21). Unlike the so-called guides 
that have proliferated to meet the demands of academic presses, who 
themselves seem to have abandoned the thought of publishing probing 
intellectual research, Naas’s Miracle and Machine is a genuine guide. Patiently 
explicated, expertly explained, demystifying without losing any sense of the 
complexity of Derrida’s thought, Miracle and Machine discusses the structure, 
architectonics, and typography of “Faith and Knowledge,” skillfully laying 
bare its why and wherefore, demonstrating how its form, style, and format 
reflect the theses within it.  
With nine chapters, an Introduction, a Prologue, an Epilogue, an 
analysis of Don DeLillo’s novel Underworld woven in as a sub-text, as a 
supplement, four substantial “Observations” on Kant, Hegel, Bergson, and 
Heidegger and a detailed and helpful timeline of Derrida’s publications 
between 1993-1995 at the end of the book, Naas’s Miracle and Machine 
masterfully brings together a macro- and micro-scopic reading, proceeding 
from the conditions and the context of the arguments of the book to the most 
minute details of its language and writing, in order to demonstrate the very 
complex stakes involved in the question of “religion.” In addition to 
explicating an undoubtedly complex Derridean text--complex in its structure 
K a s  S a g h a f i  |  1 2 3  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIII, No 2 (2015)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2015.688 
and its construction, its language and its thinking--following the logic of 
exemplarity, Naas’s book also functions as a guide about the intricacies of a 
deconstructive reading, steering and gently instructing the reader as it 
carefully proceeds. In its sweep and detail, in the clichéd phrase that I find 
impossible to avoid here, it is not possible to do this work justice. 
Naas shows “Faith and Knowledge” to be an “at once improvised and 
highly constructed” text full of repetitions, doublings and moments of 
duplicity. Demonstrating the duplicity inscribed into the very form of “Faith 
and Knowledge,” in the two words of the title, naming the two sources of 
“religion,” the two forms of religion, the dogmatic and the true, the division 
of the book into two sections (fifty-two sections composed of two sets of 
twenty-six), the two times and places of its writing: first, its presentation at a 
small, informal gathering on the island of Capri, Italy in February 1994 and 
then, its writing at Laguna Beach, California in April 1995), the two, at least 
two, kinds of “writing,” the spoken and the written, the two forms of 
typescript or font, the further division of the text into the bolded and the 
unbolded, Naas also shows that Derrida’s arguments do not proceed in a 
logical and linear fashion but are scattered throughout, progressing 
nonetheless by a constant doubling back to its themes and motif.  
Even though Derrida’s arguments are not made in a straightforward 
fashion, it is Naas’s contention that we can isolate three main theses 
underlying “Faith and Knowledge.” Naas isolates them in a chapter (that he 
must have had great fun titling) called “Three Theses on the Two Sources 
and Their One Common Element.” According to Naas, these express: the 
fundamental duplicity of religion, the fundamental conflict between science 
and religion, and the fundamental complicity of religion and science (65). 
While I am not able to pursue the full details of these topics here, I can 
highlight the focus on elementary trust, reliability or, trustworthiness 
[fiabilité].   
Among the discussions that I found extremely illuminating and that I 
greatly learned from in Miracle and Machine are: the treatment of the 
question of salut, salut as salvation or as safety (50-2) and mondialisation, the 
process of becoming world-wide (58) in Chapter 2; the discussion of the 
miracle as being coextensive with elementary faith (93-4) and testimonial 
faith’s conditioning of every social bond as an interruption, as an 
interruptive unraveling (94-5, 97-9) in Chapter 3; the theme of breath (souffle) 
(110-4), the connection between the machine (118) and faith, showing that it 
is the machine that makes possible the faith that opens up a future (120) in 
Chapter 4; the experience of the secret (127), in particular its relation to 
Christianity as a religion of internalization, of the virtualization and 
spectralization of the body of Christ in the Eucharist, explaining the 
divergent uptakes by the Abrahamic religions of what took place and was 
said between YHWH and Abraham, as well as  the specificity of Islam’s 
attachment to the untranslatable letter and its resistance to mediatization 
1 2 4  |  F o r  A  T i m e  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIII, No 2 (2015)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2015.688 
and translation (131) in Chapter 5; the penetrating examination of the most 
desert-like khōra and the rethinking of “religion” itself on the basis of 
another social bond, the one that first opens up, and interrupts in opening 
up, every community (195) in Chapter 6; the consideration of “the ellipsis of 
sacrifice” (207) and the discussion of how when the specter of life-death is 
repressed the phantasm of pure life takes its place (225) in Chapter 7--and I 
haven’t even mentioned yet the grenade and the pomegranate seeds in 
Chapter 8. 
Rather than engaging in a mechanical exercise of summary here, I 
would like to submit to scrutiny--the very scrutiny that he himself practiced 
when I had the privilege of being in his classes, in which he examined 
minute details of Platonic arguments--Naas’s discussion of an important 
theme raised at the end of his book, that of survival or living on [survivre]. I 
would like to take the opportunity here to think through with Naas a most 
pressing thought invoked in Chapter 9, entitled “The Passion of Literature: 
Genet in Laguna, Gide in Algiers.” There, Naas takes up the unusual 
juxtaposition of two writers who were important for Derrida during 
different phases of his life: Gide especially during his youth, and Genet, who 
played an important role in Derrida’s work, certainly since the composition 
of Glas. Toward the end of Chapter 9, after speculating about the role played 
by these writers in “Faith and Knowledge” and presenting a hypothesis 
about their presence at the end of the essay, Naas turns to Derrida’s views 
regarding death and the acceptance of death. 
Examining the notion of “the end” in the Western tradition that Derrida 
is reading, Naas remarks that in this tradition the end is never quite the end. 
For there is always something that comes after the end, “something like an 
afterlife or an afterworld, some kind of life ever-lasting” (263-4). What about 
Gide of Fruits of the Earth, the Journals or even The Immoralist may have 
appealed to Derrida, Naas writes, is his “unconditional embracing of life in 
the here and now, on earth and in this world, rather than sacrificing this 
world and this life to some beyond” (264). Bringing together his discussion 
of Gide with Derrida’s “final words,” words scribbled on an envelope, as he 
says, near the end of his life and read aloud by his son, Pierre Alferi, at his 
gravesite in Ris-Orangis, Naas concludes that in their “emphasis on this 
world, this finite world” both Derrida and Gide issue a plea not to sacrifice 
this world for the promise of another world.  
Naas explains that Gide’s reference to the very common expression de 
l’autre côté, on the other side, very much like Nietzsche’s thought, eschews 
an otherworldly religion or ethics, for what is promised on the other side of 
life, and encourages the celebration of the joys and riches of this world. One 
may wonder how to distinguish a thought embracing the wonders of this life 
from other competing discourses on finitude such as Nietzschean tragic 
finitude, or a certain embrace of Carpe diem by the existentialists, for whom 
Gide was a favorite author. Of course, such a belief, as Naas rightly worries, 
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can lead to the neglect of “the ‘other side’ that is to be found on this side, that 
is of the other world within this world” (267). He will go on to explain what 
he means by this other side within this world. 
Having already referred to the appeal that Derrida makes to the phrase 
de l’autre côté in Chapter 3, Naas writes that for Derrida there is already 
“another side to this ‘other side,’ not some other world beyond this world 
but an ‘other side’ or an ‘other world’ within this world” (267). This “other 
side” is “not some other world to which I might gain entrance after death 
but [rather] the inner sanctum of the other, to which I can have no access” 
(267). For this reason, Naas writes, there is “another other world, but not one 
above or beyond this one but another world ‘within’ the world, an infinitely 
other, nondialectizable, nonsynthesizable world ‘within’ this one” (268).  
And this thought becomes most poignant with the death of the other. 
At this juncture in his chapter, Naas admits that it would be difficult not 
to want to pose the question, the question that many readers of Derrida may 
have been wondering about, about whether Derrida himself believed in 
another world or in an afterlife. Quoting Derrida’s own statements about his 
own death, for example the one in A Taste for the Secret when he said “I do 
not believe that one lives on post mortem,” Naas says declaratively that 
“Derrida did not believe that we live on somewhere else or that we live 
again; he did not believe in another world; in a world ‘on the other side’ of 
this one” (270). Glossing this further, Naas observes that “while we are not 
resurrected for another life or in another life, ‘we’ do sur-vive or live on for a 
time after death through the traces we produce and the marks that make us 
visible to others. […] ’We’ begin sur-viving or living on from the moment we 
are born” (270; my emphasis). This surviving is, as Derrida wrote in Archive 
Fever, “the surviving of an excess of life” over itself.3    
In what follows I would like to underscore Naas’s use of the phrase “for 
a time” toward the end of Chapter 9 in four other instances (one of them 
italicized by him). Now I claim no expertise in numerology, and in the wake 
of Naas’s own book that makes a great case for the significance of all kinds 
of numbers in Derrida’s “Faith and Knowledge,” I cannot say anything 
substantial about this number of repetitions--five--except to point out his 
emphasis on the expression “for a time.” My remarks or questions will have 
to do with how to understand this “for a time.” 
Commenting on Derrida’s views about death and what may come after 
it, Naas goes on to say that Derrida’s work argued for and demonstrated a 
logic of survival and living on from the very beginning, though this should 
not be mistaken for a belief in an afterlife. “Derrida developed throughout 
his work,” Naas writes, “a singular thinking of survival or living on, a 
notion of the trace as what, in principle if not in fact, always survives the one 
who produced it or received it […] As soon as I utter or even read a trace, as 
soon as I make a mark, my death and my survival are implied therein, my 
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death and the trace or mark that can always survive me for a time” (Here I 
note the second appearance of the phrase “for a time”) (271; my emphasis).  
In other words, the trace survives me: “while every trace--as finite--is 
threatened by forgetting, erasure, indeed by catastrophe or apocalypse, the 
trace in principle survives me” (271). However, this powerful thought of 
survival is “a far cry from any kind of belief in an afterlife or in the 
immortality of the soul” (271). 
We begin living on already from the beginning, and we continue to live 
on in these very marks, these signs, after our deaths. But how then to 
understand this living on? When Derrida says in his final note “I love you 
and am smiling at you from wherever I am,” Naas emphasizes that “We are 
to understand living on as living on only ‘in’ these words,” in the 
subjunctive and not in the indicative, “as they are repeated or as they remain 
repeatable in others, for others—and only for a time” (271, author’s italics, the 
third appearance of the phrase). So, only in the time of “for a time.” Derrida 
did not believe, Naas continues, in an afterlife or in an eternal or immortal 
life after death but “always only a finite and very mortal survival” (272). 
Here we could ask what a “finite” and “mortal” survival would be? If 
Derrida has been rethinking “finitude” from his earliest texts, combining a 
thinking of finitude with that of the infinite, surely we cannot take “finite” 
and “mortal” here as simply the end of a short, death-bound life on this 
earth, especially since in several other places, such as The Beast and the 
Sovereign, volume 2, Derrida links finitude with a survivance that is “neither 
life nor death pure and simple.” There, writing of the alliance of the living 
and the dead, he states “this finitude […] is survivance.”4 Perhaps survivance 
requires that we think the finite in relation to the infinite. In other words, 
would we be able to think of living on as infinitely finite?  
Naas very astutely notes that “it might be thought that this living on is 
something of a consolation in the face of death, solace in the recognition that, 
although we are not immortal, the traces we leave live on within the world 
in the memories of others, in the works available to others to read, hear, or 
experience, and so on” (272). Yet, Naas explains that Derrida’s survival is, 
first, anything but a “personal” survival, “for the trace I leave behind is 
precisely not ‘my own’” and second, that “with every death, including my 
own, there comes the end not of some individual within the world but the 
end of the world as such” (272). This end of the world is, of course, a 
reference to a notion that Derrida argued for in the Preface to the French 
edition of The Work of Mourning, entitled Chaque fois unique, la fin du monde, 
where he emphatically stated that the death of the other signifies not the end 
of a world but the end of the world itself. As Naas notes, Derrida rejects the 
thought that my death can be understood and situated dialectically within 
the horizon of other deaths. In other words, Derrida does not agree with the 
idea of a common horizon of death. For, death truly is “the end of the 
world.”  
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Since Derrida did not believe that he would be going to another world, 
Naas writes, “there might be living on for a time, but certainly no afterlife” 
(272, my emphasis, fourth appearance). For, despite his genuine struggle 
and constant preoccupation with death, Derrida could not accept death. “He 
could not accept death because he--like all of us--had a certain preference for 
life” (273). He could not accept it because he could not think or assimilate it; 
he could not accept it because he wished to question and thus rethink the 
concepts he had inherited from the tradition, in particular, those of 
redemption and resurrection. We can say that what he thought was always 
on the side of life, as he described the thought of Hélène Cixous in H.C., That is 
To Say…  
Derrida “simply could not accept death,” Naas argues, “because to do 
so would be to accept nothing less than the end of the world” (273). Thus, 
the acceptance of [his own] death would be tantamount to accepting the end 
of the world. It is true that Derrida could not accept death in the sense of 
resigning himself to it. This he could never do, but he did accept death as the 
end of the world; he did know that death would be the end of the world. I 
would like to say a few more words about this at the end of my paper.  
Naas then writes that for Derrida there is living on but there would be 
no resurrection (274). With every breath one is already living on, surviving, 
not at all immortal but living on as absolutely mortal. As Naas shows 
throughout the book, Derrida’s thinking of the trace was always tied to a 
reflection on death and mourning, a mourning that begins from the very 
beginning. “Only insofar as work allows itself to be […] uprooted, displaced, 
and translated, transplanted elsewhere, can it live on for a time” (274, my 
emphasis, fifth appearance). How do we take this emphasis again on 
“absolutely mortal?” Surely, this mortality is not that of a dying subjectivity 
or of a simple finitude. How would we reconcile the relation between 
mortality and a certain living on, surviving, remaining [restance], ghostly 
coming back [revenance], that is, a certain immortality? When in one of the 
first substantial treatments of the notion of survival in an essay on Blanchot 
called “Living On: Borderlines”, Derrida remarks that in L’Arrêt de mort the 
living on [survivance] of the one who narrates [le récitant], who is a survivor, 
is also a spectral coming back, a ghostly return [cette survivance est aussi une 
revenance spectrale], what is the time or duration of this survival?5 Is its time 
only “for a time?”      
Perhaps with his stress on the expression “for a time” Naas is 
emphasizing the provisional nature of survival and living on, survival for a 
time, in the same way that he argues in Chapter 6 “’Jewgreek is Greekjew’: 
Messianicity—Khôra—Democracy,” that Derrida was not willing to give up 
the notion of the messianic “for the moment”  (172). Or perhaps Naas wants 
to say that survival lasts “for a time,” as in the duration of one’s epoch. One 
way of reading the thought that one lives on “for a time” after one’s death, 
would be to say that the memory that others have of oneself lasts only for a 
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time, only for one’s time, for one’s epoch, after which this memory naturally 
dissipates. In a wonderfully strange text entitled “‘Dead Man Running’: 
Salut, Salut,” written in honor of the 50th anniversary of Les Temps modernes, 
Derrida comments on this very thought, on what you might perhaps call 
Sartre’s over-zealous belief in finitude. In this hastily-written essay penned 
in the form of a letter to Claude Lanzmann, Derrida links epochalization, the 
fact that one’s thought belongs to an epoch, to the process of sanctification, 
showing an alliance between the concept of epoch and the concept of 
salvation. For Derrida, this emphasis on epochalization is predetermined 
and overdetermined by the value of life. So does memory just endure “for a 
time,” the time of one’s epoch? 
Or perhaps, like the Homeric belief in the fame or reputation that 
outlasts the hero’s lifetime, survival is akin to the living on of memory. This 
would, then, be something like a living on in posterity, the survival that 
posterity promises. For Homeric kleos, honor and glory is bestowed upon the 
hero who has died a glorious death and whose memory will live on. The 
hero’s desire is to perform great deeds in order to transform his death into 
eternal glory. In the Iliad Hektor does not intend to die without “some great 
deed whose fame will live on among men to come [essomenoisi puthesthai].”6 
The beautiful death (kalos thanatos), the glorious death (eukleēs thanatos), in 
the prime of youth leads to glory, virtually guaranteeing unassailable 
renown. The logic underlying heroic honor is the need to be recognized as 
supreme, to be famed “among men to come [hommes à venir].”7 
Heroic striving has its roots in the will to escape aging and death, which 
amount to amnesia, silence, demeaning obscurity, and the absence of fame. 
By welcoming death and confronting it with valor, death is overcome as 
something to be feared. What matters most is being valued, honored, and 
recognized and by being glorified in a song of praise the hero is allowed to 
continue, beyond the reach of death, to be present in the community of the 
living, his life converted into legend and linked to that of other heroic 
individuals.  In his analysis of “glorious death,” Jean-Pierre Vernant notes 
that this kleos, of course, assumes the existence of a tradition of oral poetry 
which serves as a repository of shared culture and as societal memory. The 
hero who is praised in song is not only committed to memory, 
memorialized, remaining present in the memory for all “those to come” but 
also commemorated in the memorial tomb, the raising of a sema.  
When Naas writes that accepting death is something Derrida could 
never do because it would be equivalent to accepting the end of the world, 
he appeals to Derrida’s words in Learning to Live Finally: “We are all 
survivors who have been granted a temporary reprieve [en sursis]” in order 
to underscore the temporariness of this “for a time.”8 However, isn’t the 
reprieve that Derrida is referring to here that of the duration of our life--the 
duration of our life itself as a reprieve--and not what happens after it? It is 
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our life itself, the life that is riven with death and will live on, that Derrida 
considers as a temporary reprieve (273).  
Furthermore, almost every time that Derrida wrote about the end of the 
world, whether it was in The Work of Mourning or in Rams, was it not always 
in relation to the other’s death, and not in reference to his own or the death 
of “the I?” When Naas writes that in the Preface of Chaque fois unique Derrida 
made it very clear that “death--in this case, the death of the other--must be 
understood not as an event within the world […] but as the end of the world 
itself,” does he mean to suggest that Derida could also have been referring to 
“death in general” or “my death?” Is Naas implying that this case, this 
particular case, that of the other’s death, is just an example to be included 
among the rest? (273, my emphasis). Or was it a mere coincidence that 
whenever Derrida wrote about “the end of the world” it was the death of the 
other that provoked his discussion? Can we say that it is not just “in this 
case,” but only in this case, the case of the other’s death, that he speaks of it? 
Every death of the other, each time, is the end of the world. This is 
because the other’s death is the end of the world envisioned as something 
that we commonly share. The death of the other is a reminder that what we 
call “the world,” the fact that we believe that there is only one world is the 
result of a tacit agreement, a shared history. For “the world”—whether the 
kosmos, the universe, or the globe—does indeed have a history, a history that 
requires to be told again. With the other’s death so dies a certain concept of 
the world as one world. Each birth opens up and each death closes a “unique 
world.”9  The other’s is “an other world.”  And each death, each time, 
signals “another end of the world.”10 With each death there is a world that 
disappears. It will be claimed that, nevertheless, the “world” is there. 
Derrida believed that what we call “the world” is the indispensable 
assumption or presumption of a “credible” gathering, the gathering of an 
infinity of worlds, depending on an act of faith. The presumption of a 
community, a gathering of this infinite dispersion of worlds, is faith itself. 
With the invocation of faith, it is time once again to say what a 
miraculous work Naas’s book is, miraculous in the sense that he helps us 
understand that a marvelous event causes wonder. In Miracle and Machine he 
shows us that this miracle could not be understood without a relationship to 
calculation, programming, and repetition. And the wonder is that to accede 
to the event of this miracle we had to pass via the machine, via all the 
repetitions and duplicities recounted and marvelously mapped out through 
the chapters of Miracle and Machine.   
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